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Introduction 
The US and European Union are natural partners in the global fight against 
transnational terrorism, but bureaucratic, cultural, and tactical differences threaten to 
hinder progress.  This article shows how different dimensions of and approaches to 
fighting terrorism can work at cross-purposes.  By recognizing these disparate 
dimensions within an overall framework, both sides can pursue opportunities in fostering 
greater counterterrorism cooperation while minimizing the impediments. 
 
Dimensions of the Problem 
  One of the challenges in fighting transnational terrorism is to understand the 
different aspects of the task.  Terrorism itself is not an easy term to characterize or define.  
Nor is it a new phenomenon.    Scholars have debated the threat of international terrorism 
long before the attacks of September 11
th.
2   Since the end of the Cold War, the role of 
non-state actors forming transnational networks and adopting the methods of political 
violence associated with low intensity conflict and insurgency (e.g., bombings, 
kidnapping, assassinations, hostage taking, etc.) has increased, especially in geographic 
regions where governance is weak or non-existent.
3   In fact, David Fromkin in 1991 
argued that the dynamic between international order and internal stability (or governance) 
perhaps could pose the greatest challenge to the modern state system.  In Fromkin’s 
                                                 
2 For example, see Charles W. Kegley, Jr., ed., International Terrorism: Characteristics, Causes, Controls 
(New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1990); Shireen T. Hunter, “Terrorism: A Balance Sheet,” Washington 
Quarterly 12 (Summer 1989), 17-29; Robert Oakley, “International Terrorism,” Foreign Affairs 65 
(Summer 1987), 611-629; and Walter Laqueur, “Reflections on Terrorism,” Foreign Affairs 65 (Fall 1986), 
86-100. 
3 James E. Dougherty and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., Contending Theories of International Relations 
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prescient words, “The overarching issue, as the twenty-first century may come to see it, 
will not be one cause against another, or one power against another, but order versus 
anarchy.”
4  A major component of the instability comes from the tactics and strategies of 
transnational terrorists, regardless of their disparate motivations.   
Analysts have noted that there are multiple facets to terrorism, and many have 
argued that the United States cannot win the “war against terror” alone and will need to 
use more than the military instrument to combat it.
5  For example, RAND analyst Nora 
Bensahel identifies several different functional areas where governments must work 
together against terrorists.  These include: military; financial; law enforcement; 
intelligence; and stabilization and reconstruction.
6  One might also add diplomacy and 
public diplomacy to the list.  While all these dimensions are important, diplomacy and 
public diplomacy are particularly important because they serve as an umbrella framework 
for the others.  Diplomacy sustains the various coalitions, and public diplomacy addresses 
the long-term goal of persuading the world that democratic values and respect for rule of 
law are more beneficial to humanity and global prosperity than ideologies focused on 
perpetuating intolerance, instability, and destruction.  The functional dimensions to 
combating terrorism are necessarily different but they are also interconnected.  
Sometimes they overlap, and the partners working together may be more involved in 
some areas than others. 
                                                 
4 David Fromkin, “The Coming Millennium: World Politics in the Twenty-First Century,” World Policy 
Journal (Spring 1991), 4. 
5 For example, see Andrew J. Pierre, ed., Coalitions: Building and Maintenance (Washington, DC: Institute 
for the Study of Diplomacy, Georgetown University, 2002).  Also, see James J. Carafano and Paul 
Rosenzweig, Winning the Long War: Lessons from the Cold War for Defeating Terrorism and Preserving 
Freedom (Washington, DC: Heritage Books, 2005). 
6 Nora Bensahel, “A Coalition of Coalitions: International Cooperation Against Terrorism,” Studies in 
Conflict and Terrorism 29 (2006): 35-49.   DRAFT –DO NOT QUOTE WITHOUT AUTHOR’S PERMISSION  3
The United States recognizes the challenge ahead and is working with partners – 
including the European Union (member states and institutions) in all areas of 
counterterrorism.  As then-Coordinator for Counterterrorism Henry Crumpton told a 
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, “Dealing with the threat from violent 
extremism, therefore, requires that we and our partners wage a traditional campaign using 
our judicial, law enforcement, financial, military, and diplomatic resources.”  He went on 
to say that this effort would not be easy or quick or one that the United States could 
succeed on its own.  “Countering violent extremism involves a world-wide effort.  It will 
last decades, if not longer.”
7
 
Approaches to Counterterrorism: At Cross-Purposes? 
Some critics have argued that the US and EU are incompatible when it comes to 
fighting terrorism because the two sides approach the issue so differently.
8  It is true that 
US and European counterterrorism efforts reflect many differences: different histories; 
legal traditions (even within Europe); perceptions of the causes; and instruments for 
attacking the problem.   From the US perspective, radicalization of Islamic extremists 
stems in part from opposition to US policy (especially in the Middle East), while in 
Europe, it is seen as flowing in part from alienation and economic and cultural 
discrimination.  But just because Americans and Europeans do not conceptualize the 
problem in the same way because of their different historical traditions and experiences, 
                                                 
7 Henry A. Crumpton, “Islamist Extremism in Europe,” Statement before the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee, Subcommittee on European Affairs (April 5, 2006), 2. 
8 For example, see Jonathan Stevenson, “How Europe and America Defend Themselves,” Foreign Affairs 
(March/April 2003): 75-90; Wyn Rees and Richard Aldrich, “Contending Cultures of Counterterrorism: 
Transatlantic Convergence or Divergence,” International Affairs 81 (2005): 905-923; and “Terror Litmus 
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does that mean that the two sides actually are irreconcilable when it comes to fighting 
terrorism?  In order to answer this question, one must first address the different 
approaches. 
 
D
4 versus P
3R 
Both the United States and the European Union have produced counterterrorism 
strategies, but note the contrasts in their respective documents.  The American strategy 
has four main components: 
  Defeat terrorist organizations of global reach; 
  Deny further sponsorship, support, and sanctuary to terrorists; 
  Diminish underlying conditions that terrorists seek to exploit; 
  Defend the homeland and extend defenses abroad.
9 
The European Union’s Counterterrorism Strategy also has four main components: 
  Prevent people turning to terrorism by tackling root causes; 
  Protect citizens and infrastructure; 
  Pursue and investigate terrorists and bring them to justice; 
  Respond (prepare) to manage and minimize consequences of an attack.
10 
 
Such emphasis provides insight into the different approaches.  The following 
section characterizes the broad American and European approaches and then judges 
whether these differences are enough to prevent practical cooperation among the multiple 
dimensions of terrorism.  First, let us examine the American approach. 
                                                 
9 The White House, National Strategy for Combating Terrorism (Washington, DC: February 2003), 15-28. 
10 Council of the European Union, The European Union Counterterrorism Strategy (Brussels: November 
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US Approach: War, External, Proactive 
The American approach may be described by three words: war, external, and 
proactive.  Each of these will be briefly examined. 
First, the US sees the fight against terrorism as a “war.”   The National Security 
Strategy starts off by saying that “America is at war.”  Consequently, there has been a 
heavy input from the Defense Department and armed forces in disrupting terrorist 
networks.   Al-Qaida is considered a non-state actor, and American officials have been 
consistent in describing the war as different from a conventional military conflict 
between nation states, but an armed conflict nonetheless.  As the State Department’s legal 
advisor has argued: 
 
[The United States was] clearly justified in using military force in self-
defense against al-Qaida.  Al-Qaida is not a nation state, but it planned and 
executed violent attacks with an international reach, magnitude, and 
sophistication that could previously be achieved only by nation states.  Its 
leaders explicitly declared war against the United States, and al-Qaida 
members attacked our embassies, our military vessels, our financial center, 
our military headquarters, and our capital city, killing more than 3,000 
people in the process.  In our view, these facts fully supported our 
determination that we were justified in responding in self-defense, just as 
we would have been if a nation had committed these acts against us.
11
 
Second, the US approach places an emphasis on the external.  For the United 
States, the extraterritorial nature of the al-Qaida network (not to mention the Taliban 
government in Afghanistan, which harbored al-Qaida terrorists) led the Americans to 
view the threat’s external dimension.  Consequently, the US approach consistently has 
been to “take the fight” to the enemy and push the borders out.  Such a “forward defense” 
                                                 
11 John Bellinger III, “Legal Issues in the War on Terrorism,” Speech given to London School of 
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approach is consistent with US national security policy since the end of the Cold War.  
As Dan Hamilton writes, “Despite the impact of September 11 on the United States, the 
natural instinct in a nation bounded by two oceans is still to fight one’s enemies abroad so 
one doesn’t need to fight them at home.”
12  Thus, the focus of the American 
counterterrorism strategy has been to reach out to beyond Europe to the rest of world, 
including the Philippines, Russia, China, Pakistan, India, and Australia.  As the National 
Counterterrorism Strategy states, “As our enemies exploit the benefits of our global 
environment to operate around the world, our approach must be global as well.”
13  This is 
one reason why the US developed the Container Security Initiative.  The logic was to 
reach out to improve port security before potential threats reached American shores.  A 
similar rationale with respect to airline passengers motivated the search for a mechanism 
for using Passenger Name Record (PNR) information to conduct security checks. 
Third, the US approach has been proactive.  From an institutional perspective, the 
US created the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and implemented major reform 
of the Intelligence Community in order to be better prepared for future threats.  In May 
2003, the US launched the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI).  The PSI’s goal was “to 
create a more dynamic, creative, and proactive approach to preventing proliferation to or 
from nation states and non-state actors of proliferation concern.”
14  It also explains why 
the US has promoted reform and democracy in the Middle East, recognizing that 
economic and democratic opportunities are needed to counter radicalized ideologies.  
                                                 
12 Daniel Hamilton, “Introduction: Transforming Homeland Security: A Road Map for the Transatlantic 
Alliance,” in Esther Brimmer (ed) Transforming Homeland Security: US and European Approaches 
(Washington, DC: Center for Transatlantic Relations, 2006), xiii. 
13 National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, Washington, DC (February 2003), 29. 
14 “The Proliferation Security Initiative” Factsheet.  [Available at 
http://usinfo.state.gov/products/pubs/proliferation], (Accessed April 19, 2007). DRAFT –DO NOT QUOTE WITHOUT AUTHOR’S PERMISSION  7
Again, in the words of the National Counterterrorism Strategy, “Finding a solution to the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict is a critical component to winning the war of ideas.  No other 
issue has so colored the perception of the United States in the Muslim world.”
15
 
EU Approach: Crime, Internal, Reactive 
Primary responsibility for most European counterterrorism policies remains with 
the 27 EU governments, which have presented coordination problems both within the EU 
and between the US and EU.  How have they approached counterterrorism cooperation?  
Three words describe the EU approach: crime, internal, and reactive.   
Europeans are quick to note that they have had to deal with terrorism long before 
September 11, 2001.  The British confronted the Irish Republican Army (IRA), the 
Spanish fought the Basque separatists (ETA), and Germans the Baader Meinhof, to 
mention just a few of the more famous examples.  However, many of these counter-
terrorist efforts were different from the current circumstances in two respects: national 
approach and political end.  In the pre-September 11
th environment, Europeans 
approached counterterrorism primarily on a national basis against primarily national 
groups with defined political ends who were at times open to negotiation.  Moreover, the 
prime goal for these groups was not to inflict massive casualties but to incite fear and 
move the national government to a particular political end.
16
Changes since the end of the Cold War, however, have forced European 
governments to reevaluate the need to cooperate at a regional, rather than national level.  
First, implementation of the Single Market during the late 1980s and early 1990s 
                                                 
15 National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, 24. 
16 See Jonathan Stevenson, “How Europe and America Defend Themselves,” Foreign Affairs (March/April 
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introduced the concept of free movement – of goods, people, services, and capital.  If 
internal borders were to be broken down, then external borders needed to be 
strengthened.    
Second, globalization – advances in communication and transportation – made it 
easier for people to transit Europe than ever before.  Globalization also made it easier for 
small groups, including non-state actors, to organize.  One of the significant differences 
between before and after September 11 has been recognition of the transnational nature 
of terrorism.  Al-Qaida is a global network.   
Third, geopolitical events – the first Gulf War, the collapse of the Soviet Union, 
and the Balkan wars – increased the level of organized crime by disrupting societies and 
creating opportunities for exploitation in ungoverned areas.  Scholars have observed the 
linkages between terrorist groups and organized criminal entities.  For example, in Spain, 
al-Qaida raised funds from credit card schemes.
17  In Belgium, forged passports and 
diamond smuggling were used for money laundering.  In Germany, privacy laws were 
exploited to store contraband.  In Italy, counterfeit couture raised funds for locals, and 
Russian and Albanian mafia groups smuggled people into the UK.
18  They also 
heightened the risk that small groups would be in a position to inflict mass casualties 
through unconventional means.   
Finally, demographic dynamics – especially increases in migration and 
differences in birth rates – have made Europe a home for a percentage of Muslims, some 
of whom may become radicalized and recruited to violent extremism, thus increasing the 
                                                 
17 Fernando Reinares, “Hacia una caracterización social del terrosimo yihadista en España: implications en 
seguridad interior y acción exterior,” ARI 34/2006 (Madrid: Real Instituto Elcano de Estudios 
Internationcionales y Estratégicos, 2006).  
18 Interviews with EU officials, Brussels, May 31, 2006.  Also, see “The Transatlantic Dialogue on 
Terrorism: Initial Findings,” (Washington, DC: CSIS, August 2004). DRAFT –DO NOT QUOTE WITHOUT AUTHOR’S PERMISSION  9
potential for homegrown terrorists.  The ability of Europeans to fight these seemingly 
disparate situations has become crucial.  As experts have noted to Congress, Europe has 
become both a terrorist launch pad (as in 9/11 attacks) and a target in it own right (3/11 
and 7/7 attacks).
19  Moreover, as the United States adjusted its homeland defenses, 
making it harder for terrorists to attack the US directly, Europe itself became more 
vulnerable.  At the same time, the longer Europeans squabbled amongst themselves or 
delayed improving their homeland security, the United States remained vulnerable.
20  
Thus, the dynamic was set in place where trust was needed, and yet recriminations across 
the Atlantic seemed to erode that trust. 
It is clear from reading almost any EU document that Europeans regard terrorism 
as primarily a criminal, not military, act.  A review of the EU Counterterrorism Action 
Plan and EU Counterterrorism strategy reveals that the emphasis is on legislation to 
criminalize terrorism.  “Framework Decisions” are the main instruments for such 
legislation.  In contrast to economic and trade legislation, where the European 
Commission has significant power, counterterrorism falls under the so-called Third Pillar 
of Justice and Home Affairs.  Framework Decisions are made by the national ministers 
(usually Justice or Interior), and unanimity is the rule.
21   
  Even the section of the EU Counterterrorism Strategy on “Pursue” reflects a 
domestic criminal law flavor.  The EU will “work to reinforce the international consensus 
                                                 
19 Robin Niblett, “Islamic Extremism in Europe,” Statement before the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee, Subcommittee on European Affairs (April 5, 2006); Henry A. Crumpton, “Islamic Extremism 
in Europe,” Statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Subcommittee on European Affairs 
(April 5, 2006); and Daniel Benjamin, “Islamic Extremism in Europe,” Statement before the Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee, Subcommittee on European Affairs (April 5, 2006). 
20 Stevenson, “How Europe and America Defend Themselves,” 76. 
21 For example, see Hugo Brady and Monica Roma, “Let Justice Be Done: Punishing Crime in the EU” 
Center for European Reform Policy Brief (April 2006), [Available at www.cer.org.uk]; and Balzacq and 
Carrera, “The EU’s Fight Against International Terrorism: Security Problems, Insecure Solutions.” DRAFT –DO NOT QUOTE WITHOUT AUTHOR’S PERMISSION  10
through the United Nations and other international bodies and through dialogue and 
agreements (which include counter-terrorism clauses).”
22  While European states are 
doing much more in terms of pursuing, disrupting, and dismantling terrorist networks, the 
EU rhetoric fosters an impression in the United States that engaging terrorists in dialogue 
or having a clause in a Third Party agreement will be sufficient to stop those wishing to 
inflict mass casualties through catastrophic terrorism. 
  Second, unlike the US, which views counterterrorism with a heavy external 
dimension (the Global War on Terror), EU member states have been, necessarily, much 
more focused on the internal dimension.  The lead agencies in counterterrorism are not 
the defense ministries, but rather the interior and justice ministries.  Interior and Justice 
Ministers are at the center of European counterterrorism policies.  They and their 
respective intelligence services are the ones taking the lead on disrupting terrorist 
networks.  The European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) in practical terms has had 
very little direct connection to counterterrorism.  From the ESS standpoint, ESDP’s 
emphasis is on regional conflict stabilization and reconstruction, peacekeeping, rule-of-
law, and humanitarian missions.
 23  The idea that European military personnel would be 
used to guard European soil (in a Homeland Defense function) has little resonance in 
European capitals – for both historical and political reasons.
24
                                                 
22 Council of the European Union, “The European Union Counterterrorism Strategy,” (Brussels: November 
30, 2005), 14. 
23 The June 2004 European Council report did request the Political and Security Committee (PSC) to 
develop a conceptual framework identifying how ESDP could relate to the fight against terrorism.  The 
subsequent framework emphasized how ESDP external peacekeeping operations complement 
counterterrorism by contributing to external stability.  Examples include the EU’s border monitoring in 
Gaza.  See European Council Report 14797/04, “Conceptual Framework on the ESDP Dimension of the 
Fight Against Terrorism,” [Available at 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/ESDPdimension.pdf], Accessed March 31, 2007.  
24 For example, see Ralph Thiele, “Intervention und die Sicherheit zu Hause in Deutschland: 
Transformation der Sicherheitspolitik unter neuen Vorzeichen,” in Heiko Borchert (ed) Weniger DRAFT –DO NOT QUOTE WITHOUT AUTHOR’S PERMISSION  11
EU member states are interested in protecting their critical infrastructure and are 
pursuing policies to do so.  Guarding approaches are the provenance of EU Transport 
Ministers.  They are the ones to agree on measures to protect airports, including screening 
of luggage from potential explosives.  The EU created the Agency for the Management of 
External Borders (FRONTEX).  Located in Warsaw and operational since October 2005, 
FRONTEX oversees national border guard training, risk analysis, technical and 
operational assistance to member states, and external border management.  Finnish 
Director Ilkka Laitinen has a staff of about 70 persons and a 2006 budget of €15.7 
million, and he must rely on voluntary contributions from member states.
25  In February 
2007, 19 of 29 countries (including non-EU Schengen members Norway and Iceland) 
committed equipment to FRONTEX for border monitoring operations.  However, the 
pledges amounted to only half of the border agency’s stated equipment needs.
26
Finally, counterterrorism at the EU level may be characterized as reactive, with 
Europeans engaged in furious activity shortly after an attack, followed by a slowdown as 
measures become bogged down in their implementation by politics and sovereignty 
concerns.  The EU has made progress primarily as a result of the shock of actual or 
attempted terrorist attacks.  The most notable are: the 9/11 attacks, the Madrid bombings 
in 2004, the London bombings in 2005, and the August 2006 plot in the UK. 
Before the September 2001 attacks, the EU had no common definition or 
penalties for terrorism.  The Tampere Agenda, which was introduced under the Finnish 
                                                                                                                                                 
Souveränität – Mehr Sichereit (Hamburg: Verlag E.S. Mittler & Sohn, 2004).  Also, see Daniel Hamilton, 
Bengt Sundelius, and Jesper Grönvall, eds., Protecting the Homeland: European Approaches to Societal 
Security – Implications for the United States (Washington, DC: Center for Transatlantic Relations, 2005).  
25 Meeting with FRONTEX officials, Warsaw, October 17, 2006. 
26 Renata Goldirova, “EU Cross-border Police Pursuits Blocked,” EUObserver.com (February 15, 2007), 
[Available at http://euobserver.com], (Accessed February 16, 2007). DRAFT –DO NOT QUOTE WITHOUT AUTHOR’S PERMISSION  12
EU presidency in 1999, had stalled.
27  The main focus at the time was how best to allow 
EU citizens to take full advantage of the Single Market and the Schengen area.
28   
However, 9/11 was a wake-up call for EU member states.  The power of external shock 
revealed how vulnerable the EU was internally.  In response, the EU acted with relative 
speed.  Member states agreed to a common definition of terrorism.  They created a 
common list of terrorist organizations and clearinghouse for freezing terrorist assets.  
They agreed to strengthen the European Police Office (Europol) and introduce a common 
European arrest warrant (EAW).   The manner in which the Europeans negotiated the 
EAW was different from past practices.  EU member states consulted with the US early 
and often.  Previously, in the case of bilateral mutual legal assistance treaties (MLAT), 
Europeans would consult among themselves, and shut out US officials.   
In December 2003, the EU produced a European Security Strategy (ESS).  The 
ESS listed the main threats to Europe – terrorism, WMD proliferation, regional and/or 
ethnic conflict, state failure, and organized crime. 
These accomplishments notwithstanding, momentum soon lagged.  The EAW, 
agreed in December 2001, was not actually adopted by all member states until 2004.  
Even then, there were problems.  In February 2005, the European Commission noted that 
eleven of the then-25 member states had made mistakes when transposing the arrest 
                                                 
27 For background on the Tampere Agenda and earlier attempts to cooperate in this area, see John D. 
Occhipinti, The Politics of EU Police Cooperation: Toward a European FBI?  (Boulder, CO: Lynne 
Rienner, 2003); Kristin Archick, Europe and Counterterrorism: Strengthening Police and Judicial 
Cooperation. Congressional Research Service Report (July 23, 2002), and Monica Den Boer and Jörg 
Monar, “Keynote Article: 11 September and the Challenge of Global Terrorism to the EU as a Security 
Actor.” Journal of Common Market Studies 40 (Annual Review, 2002): 11-28 
28 When the Amsterdam Treaty came into force in May 1999, the Schengen Agreement became part of the 
legal and institutional framework of the EU for dealing with asylum/migration, visa policy and rights of 
third-country nationals, immigration policy, and external border controls.  All members of the EU-15 
(except UK and Ireland) participate fully in Schengen.  Because of certain Nordic agreements, Norway and 
Iceland also are Schengen members.  Switzerland, although not an EU member, joined Schengen in 2005.  
The new EU member states are expected to participate in Schengen beginning in 2007.   DRAFT –DO NOT QUOTE WITHOUT AUTHOR’S PERMISSION  13
warrant legislation into national law.
29   The cultural/bureaucratic differences between 
law enforcement/police and intelligence approaches, as well as fears that EU institutions 
were encroaching upon national sovereignty, limited further cooperation.  Unanimity was 
required in the terrorist clearinghouse, meaning that a single member state could prevent 
Hamas or Hizbollah from being put on the list. 
The March 2004 Madrid train bombings re-energized Europeans to pursue 
coordinated action against terrorism.  EU member states established a Counterterrorism 
Coordinator, naming former Dutch Deputy Interior Minister Gijs De Vries to the post.  
Answering to the member states, De Vries was responsible for streamlining the EU’s 
counterterrorism instruments, assessing the terrorist threat in Europe, and monitoring 
member-state implementation of EU-mandated legislation.  However, member states 
equipped him to do his job with only token staff and budget, and no operational 
authority.
30  After three years in the job, De Vries decided not to renew his contract and 
stepped down at the end of March 2007.  The value of the Coordinator’s post was called 
into question in a recent European Parliament Report.
31
The Situation Center (SITCEN) took on additional responsibility to provide 
information and analysis on EU-wide terrorist threats.  The Brussels unit is small, 
comprised mostly of experts seconded from national governments. 
The July 2005 London bombings were an additional wake-up call.  The fact that 
the suicide bombers were homegrown added a new and disturbing dimension to European 
                                                 
29 Hugo Brady and Daniel Keohane, “Fighting Terrorism: The EU Needs a Strategy Not a Shopping List,” 
Centre for European Reform Briefing Note (October 2005), 2.  Available at www.cer.org.uk.  
30 Interview with EU official, Brussels, May 31, 2006. 
31 Honor Mahony, “EU Anti-terror Coordinator to Step Down,” EU Observer (February 12, 2007) 
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efforts.  The EU agreed to a counterterrorism strategy in November 2005.  Prominent in 
the strategy was the need to combat the radicalization and recruitment of terrorists.
32   
In December 2005, the EU published its Action Plan on Combating Terrorism.  
The Action Plan is a detailed matrix of activities, with a goal of measures to be taken, 
deadlines, and appropriate EU entities responsible.  
The thwarted plots in August 2006 in the UK, as well as one in Germany, 
reminded Europeans that they were still quite vulnerable to attack.  The plot in Germany 
was particularly troublesome because the German government had been strongly against 
the war in Iraq.  This revealed that no one was immune.  As early as April 2004, Bavarian 
Interior Minister Günther Beckstein had warned his fellow Germans that they should not 
“delude themselves” into thinking that they were exempt from becoming a potential 
terrorist target just because they had opposed the US-led invasion against Iraq.
33
At a September 2006 Justice and Home Affairs Council meeting, EU president 
Finland urged fellow member states to create an instrument that would provide common 
principles for storing information from video surveillance of major traffic junctions.
34  
 
Terrorism Threat is real 
Even if transatlantic threat perceptions vary somewhat, American and European 
officials generally agree on the threat and that it is real.  A cursory comparison of the US 
national security strategy and EU security strategies is a case in point.   According to the 
                                                 
32 “The European Union Strategy for Combating Radicalization and Recruitment to Terrorism,” November 
24, 2005. [Available at http://www.consilium.europa.eu], (Accessed April 14, 2007). 
33 Günther Beckstein, “Bedrohung internationaler Terrorismus: Was muss Deutschland für die Innere 
Sicherheit tun?” in Homeland Security – Die Bedrohung durch den Terrorismus als Herausforderung für 
eine gesamtstaatliche Sicherheitsarchitektur, ed. Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik, Berliner 
Forum Zukunft, (April 29, 2004), 5. 
34 “Changing Nature of Terrorism Requires a Continuing Response from EU Security Authorities,” Finland 
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2002 US National Security Strategy, global terrorism is a major threat to democratic 
regimes and the civilized world.
35  The European Security Strategy of December 2003 
lists terrorism as one of five key threats to the EU.
36  The attacks in Madrid and London 
have helped European governments recognize that they are not immune.  European 
intelligence officials believe that as many as thirty “spectacular” attacks have been 
planned since September 11.
37  In October 2006, EU officials conducted a mock exercise 
to test their preparedness for a wave of terrorist attacks.  In the exercise scenario, officials 
had to respond to a near-simultaneous terrorist attack in five EU cities.  The purpose was 
to see how well EU institutions such as the Commission and Council Secretariat 
coordinate their various responses.  According to Commission officials, the EU’s joint 
capacity was pretty good, although a review of the exercise highlighted the need for 
better use of communication technology.
38  In March 2007, Europol released its first EU 
terrorism trends report, which stated that the terrorist threat to the EU is “more serious 
than ever.”
39   
However, even as the threat perceptions within government circles across the 
Atlantic have narrowed, the perceptions among publics in different EU states and the US 
continue to vary widely.
40  For many Europeans, the attacks on Madrid and London were 
viewed as attacks on Spain and the UK, not the EU, and they were attacks based on those 
                                                 
35 The White House, National Security Strategy of the United States (Washington, DC: September 2002), 1-
2. 
36 Javier Solana, “A Secure Europe in a Better World,” (Brussels: December 12, 2003), 3. 
37 Benjamin, “Islamic Extremism in Europe,” 1. 
38 AFP, “EU Institutions’ Preparedness for Terror Attacks Tested,” October 31, 2006. 
39 Europol, EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Report 2007 (The Hague: March 2007), 7. 
40 See The German Marshall Fund of the United States, Transatlantic Trends – Key Findings 2006.  Also, 
see Gerd Föhrenbach, “Transatlantic Homeland Security and the Challenge of Diverging Risk 
Perceptions,” in Esther Brimmer (ed) Transforming Homeland Security: US and European Approaches 
(Washington, DC: Center for Transatlantic Relations, 2006), 43-55.  Föhrenbach arrives at a similar 
conclusion, but he argues that the gap in threat perceptions is greater between government and public than 
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countries’ participation in Iraq rather than because they were considered modern, 
Western states.
41  Such variance in public attitudes may constrain government officials 
from taking greater risks in implementing controversial counterterrorism measures. 
EU officials are making a concerted effort to deal with the danger of 
radicalization and recruitment.  EU member states are aware that Islamist extremists pose 
a potential threat, but have different ways of dealing with the problem.
42  Muslims in 
certain European countries continue to feel alienated or disaffected even if they have 
lived in the country for years.
43   A recent study of 242 jihadi terrorists in Europe 
concludes that more than 40 percent were born in Europe and an additional 55 percent 
were raised or long-term residents in Europe.
44  A mini-summit of EU justice ministers 
was held in London on August 16, 2006 to discuss new security measures.  At a press 
conference afterwards, EU Justice Commissioner Frattini recommended blocking 
websites that “incite to commit terrorist actions.” While stressing that he favored a 
European Islam, Frattini also suggested that Imams should be trained to “incorporate 
European values in their teachings.”
45  
However, dealing with Muslim minority populations within Europe will be 
particularly problematic because of uneven distribution of Muslims among the member 
                                                 
41 Föhrenbach, “Transatlantic Homeland Security and Diverging Risk Perceptions,” 49. 
42 See Paul Gallis et. al., Muslims in Europe: Integration Policies in Selected Countries (Washington, DC: 
Congressional Research Service, November 18, 2005).  Also, see Frederick Kempe, “Europe’s Middle East 
Side Story,” Wall Street Journal (July 29, 2003). 
43 For example, see Office of Research, “Spanish Muslims Do Not Feel Deeply Rooted in Spain,” 
(Washington, DC: US Department of State, October 11, 2005).  In the survey, eight in ten Muslims in 
Spain said that they had personally experienced racism and discrimination due to their ethnicity or religion.  
Moreover, Muslims living in Madrid reported feeling more alienated (and less Spanish) from the general 
public than Muslims living elsewhere in Spain. 
44 Edwin Bakker, “Jihadi Terrorists in Europe, Their Characteristics and the Circumstances in Which They 
Joined the Jihad: An Exploratory Study,” (The Hague: Clingendael Institute, January 2007). 
45 EU Observer, (August 17, 2006). DRAFT –DO NOT QUOTE WITHOUT AUTHOR’S PERMISSION  17
states, and the political and religious sensitivities involved.
46 [Table 1]  The origins of 
Muslim populations in EU states also differ (i.e., British Muslims generally from South 
Asia; German Muslims from Turkey; and French Muslims from North Africa).   One 
proposal put forward by the Europeans was to develop a “non-emotive lexicon” for 
discussing issues “in order to avoid linking Islam to terrorism.”  Yet, in the same 
paragraph, the EU strategy talks about encouraging the “emergence of European imams” 
and engaging with “Muslim organizations and faith groups that reject the distorted 
version of Islam put forward by al-Qaida and others.”
47
In any event, European officials generally have shied away from a public debate 
over the long-term solution of integrating and assimilating these populations into their 
societies.
48  The very notion that the current threat may be internal, combined with their 
previous experience with domestic terrorism in the 1970s and 1980s, led Europeans to 
consider the domestic criminal law framework.   
 
Institutional Dimension 
Besides contrasting approaches to counterterrorism, the US and EU must contend 
with various institutional dynamics as well.  Asymmetries in perceived vulnerabilities 
affect how different EU member states support addressing the problem at the EU level.  
Moreover, the primary institutional link for the United States remains NATO.  The 
                                                 
46 See International Crisis Group Europe Report 181, Islam and Identity in Germany, March 14, 2007;  For 
a representative look at the debate over integrating Muslims into European society, see Der Spiegel, 
“Haben wir schon die Scharia?” (13/2007), 22-35; and The Economist, “The Uncomfortable Politics of 
Identity” (October 21, 2006), 48. 
47 Council of the European Union, “The European Union Strategy for Combating Radicalization and 
Recruitment to Terrorism,” (Brussels, November 24, 2005), 4. 
48 Esther Brimmer, “From Territorial Security to Society Security: Implications for the Transatlantic 
Strategic Outlook,” in Esther Brimmer (ed) Transforming Homeland Security: US and European 
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following chart [Table 2] shows the progress made toward counterterrorism by NATO 
and the EU.  Not surprisingly, the NATO elements fall mainly in the military/homeland 
defense dimension, while the EU efforts are more holistic.  However, the progress on the 
EU front is quite uneven.  Numerous efforts included in the Action Plan are rhetorical, 
with implementation continuing to fall to the member states, often stalled in national 
assemblies.
49    
There also are tensions within the EU institutions themselves.  The relationship 
between the Council Secretariat, the Presidency country, and the Commission is only one 
aspect.  Within the Commission, there are coordination challenges among the various 
Commissioners: Frattini (Justice, Freedom, and Security), Kovacs (taxation; combating 
fraud and counterfeiting) and McCreevy (internal market and head of the Financial 
Action Task Force on Money Laundering – FATF).
50  Moreover, the increase in 
autonomous EU agencies (e.g., FRONTEX, Europol, Eurojust, and European Data 
Protection Supervisor) has the potential of complicating coordination simply because of 
new bureaucratic actors seeking to define their roles and missions. 
 
Prospects for Cooperation 
  What are the prospects for transatlantic counterterrorism cooperation?  The 
following section will discuss the prospects based on the different dimensions of 
counterterrorism and will analyze where the prospects are brighter, or where further work 
needs to be done. 
                                                 
49 Stefania Bianchi, “EU: Madrid Resolutions Fade Away,” Terraviva Europe (March 10, 2005).  Available 
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Military.  On the military front, NATO’s International Security Assistance Force 
(ISAF) continues to be an area where the US and its allies have consensus on the need to 
remain engaged.  However, such cooperation and commitment have been tested in recent 
months, and continued participation cannot be taken for granted.  The EU is considering 
an ESDP police mission in Afghanistan, which would be linked to NATO ISAF 
operations.  
In Europe, the Alliance has made progress in the area of homeland defense – 
including guarding approaches to NATO borders (especially maritime), upgrading air 
defense capabilities, and improving coordination in consequence management.
51
Diplomatic.  On the diplomatic front, there are three main areas where the 
Americans and Europeans should focus: promoting democratic values and the rule of 
law, the Middle East, and Iran.  These areas, while distinct, are not unrelated.   
Promoting democracy is crucial for achieving a long-term solution to the fight 
against terrorism.  Respect for human life and the rule of law are the foundation of 
modern Western society.  These are the concepts that radical extremists seek to 
undermine.  Diplomatic efforts to find peaceful solutions to intractable conflicts and to 
support democratic movements through the development of legitimate institutions remain 
a hallmark of US foreign policy and goal for US-EU cooperation.  According to the 2006 
US National Security Strategy, “In the world today, the fundamental character of regimes 
matters as much as the distribution of power among them.  The goal of our statecraft is to 
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help create a world of democratic, well-governed states that can meet the needs of their 
citizens and conduct themselves responsibly in the international system.”
52
Thus, the US and EU should continue the practice of working together to 
encourage good governance, help other countries build sound administrative and judicial 
institutions, and cooperate in areas where there are weak or failing states.  Supporting and 
reinforcing these concepts at home will reinforce the legitimacy of promoting them 
abroad.  As Brimmer states, “Democracy is a fundamental component of creating a just 
society providing a mechanism for the governed to select their leaders and participate in 
decision-making.  A just society is better and more stable than an unjust one.”  
Ultimately, Brimmer argues, “Our security policies must not degrade these features, 
which are central to what makes our society worth defending in the first place.”
53  
Working to find diplomatic solutions to the problems in the Middle East represent 
a second area where the US and EU can work together.
54  Solving the conflict between 
Israelis and the Palestinians would not eliminate the threat of transnational terrorism, but 
it might go a long way to diminishing recruitment and radicalization.   As the EU 
Counterterrorism Strategy states, “[W]orking to resolve conflicts and promote good 
governance and democracy will be essential elements of the Strategy…in order to address 
the motivational and structural factors underpinning radicalization.”
55
Finally, dealing effectively with Iran has the potential of reducing tension in the 
Middle East.  US and Europe can ease the threat of terrorism by persuading Tehran that 
supporting terrorist groups such as Hizbollah is inconsistent with Iran’s long-term interest 
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in gaining respect and participating in the international system.  Americans and 
Europeans must also work together to curb Iranian nuclear activities, which would reduce 
the threat of WMD proliferation. 
Homeland Security and Law Enforcement.  A balance must be found between 
protecting society at large from terrorist attack and preserving the civil liberties of 
individuals that form the foundation of modern Western civilization.  It would be facile to 
suggest that there is a stark transatlantic rift on this issue, where Americans ignore civil 
liberties and the Europeans uphold them.  According to latest Transatlantic Trends 
survey, European and American views toward civil liberties are remarkably close (in fact, 
Europeans support greater government authority than Americans with respect to 
surveillance cameras and monitoring bank transactions, while they are the same with 
respect to monitoring internet communication and phone calls).
56  There are valid 
differences between the way that Americans and Europeans treat and protect personal 
information.  EU countries tend to have formal systems and a tradition of independent 
data protection supervisors.  Europeans also seem more receptive to privacy intrusions by 
allowing for national identity cards, a notion that many in the US would consider to be an 
unacceptable infringement of their privacy rights.
57  The EU itself has been wrestling 
with the issue of data protection within Europe.
58  Analysts and scholars on both sides of 
the Atlantic hold a range of views on the subject, and the debate no doubt will continue.
59
                                                 
56 German Marshall Fund of the United States, Transatlantic Trends – Key Findings 2006 [Available at 
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Despite the different traditions and approach to data privacy, the two sides have 
succeeded in reaching information sharing agreements that have advanced our 
counterterrorism cooperation.  Shortly after the September 2001 attacks, the US and EU 
formed a counter-terrorism task force.  Included in this task force were liaisons between 
the FBI and Europol.  In December 2001, the first Europol Agreement was signed, 
involving strategic information exchange.  A second Europol Agreement for even closer 
cooperation was signed in 2002.  The US-EU Mutual Legal Assistance (MLAT) and 
Extradition Treaties were signed in June 2003.
60  The US-EU MLAT allows for the use 
of new techniques, such as joint investigative teams and videoconference technology to 
take testimony from foreign-located witnesses, possibly reducing the risk of critical 
evidence or information slipping through the bureaucratic cracks.   
Along with the MLAT, the US-EU Extradition Treaty formalizes an institutional 
framework for law enforcement relations with the EU member states.  The treaty creates 
new law enforcement relationships and updates older bilateral treaties that did not cover 
modern offenses such as money laundering. 
Other agreements include an October 2006 agreement with Eurojust that will 
permit greater transatlantic cooperation in prosecutorial matters.   Washington and 
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Brussels continue to work on accords on PNR data.  As European Commissioner Frattini 
said at an April 5
th meeting with US officials in Berlin:  
 
The transatlantic security partnership is particularly strong in the area of 
justice, freedom, and security….At a time of global threat from 
international terrorism, security issues play a significant role in the 
cooperation between the EU and the United States.  In order to overcome 
these challenges together, we must closely coordinate our efforts, share 
information, and cooperate on law enforcement as much as possible.
61
 
 
The US Attorney General and Secretary for Homeland Security meet twice each 
year with their respective EU counterparts, Commissioner Frattini and Justice and 
Interior Ministers, in the JHA Ministerial.  Moreover, there are many ongoing dialogues 
at expert level covering border and transportation security, law enforcement, and 
counterterrorism cooperation.  These dialogues help the respective parties develop 
standards for travel documents, sharing information, and cargo screening, and help the 
two sides coordinate new initiatives and efforts with international organizations and third 
countries.  
  Financial.  In the financial sphere, the scope and potential for cooperation remain 
robust.  Combating terrorism finance is critical in draining the resources available to 
terrorist operations.  The US and EU should continue the informal dialogue 
encompassing critical legislative and regulatory issues.  Such a dialogue includes expert-
level exchanges, workshops on protecting charities from terrorist abuse, developing best 
practices in investigations/prosecutions, and improving effectiveness of designations.  
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Greater coordination among international institutions is an important component of this 
approach.
62
 
Conclusion 
  Differences between transatlantic threat perceptions have narrowed, and there is 
greater recognition that America and Europe – despite different historical traditions, legal 
approaches, and capabilities – must work together for the common defense has become 
clear.  The key is to remain cognizant of the different dimensions related to terrorism, as 
well as the time horizons.  The tactical operational considerations should not impede the 
longer-term, strategic goal of de-legitimizing terrorism as an instrument for political 
violence. 
  There are at least seven areas where the US and EU agree: 1) the scope of the 
threat; 2) the illegitimacy of terrorism as an instrument of political violence; 3) 
vulnerability caused by globalization; 4) the need to dismantle terrorist organizations; 5) 
a role for the UN and international partners; 6) the importance of conflict resolution, 
governance, and democracy; and 7) the importance of addressing the Israeli/Palestinian 
conflict. 
If anti-terrorism protection and emergency response fundamentally is local, then 
information gathering and sharing must be global.  One of the major concerns is that the 
threat crosses not only borders but also across sectors.  Thus, what is needed is a multi-
level, multi-sector approach that also includes public/private cooperation.  According to 
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one expert, as much as 80 percent of Europe’s critical infrastructure was in the hands of 
the private sector.
63  While private entities were focused on protecting their own 
particular asset, terrorists may be able to exploit vulnerabilities in the seams.  Achieving 
such cooperation will be difficult because infrastructure owners may be reluctant to share 
information, believing that such disclosure would increase their exposure to attack.
64
The terrorist risk varies among sectors.  To date, the major terrorist attacks in 
Europe had been against transportation infrastructure.  As one security expert commented 
recently in Brussels, “While the transport infrastructure was the most vulnerable, it was 
almost impossible to protect, as it was an ‘open system’ with 5,000 km. of track.”
65  
Information systems, energy distribution networks, and food supply also are critical 
sectors.  The Internet also is an open system, which terrorists have been keen to exploit 
(through recruitment, communication, fund raising, and operational planning). 
Layered approaches may represent one answer.  Going beyond best practices also 
will need to be emphasized.  The US should continue to pursue avenues of cooperation 
with Europe, at the national, and through the EU and NATO.
66  Dialogue has the 
potential of building trust among stakeholders – both public and private – that is key to 
taking effective actions to fight terrorism. 
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Table 1: Muslims in the EU 
  
          
(millions)  (millions)    
Member State  Population  Muslims  Percentage
Cyprus  0.9 0.2  17.8%
Bulgaria  7.5 0.9  12.0%
France  60.4 5.0 8.3%
Netherlands  15.8 1.0 6.3%
Denmark  5.3 0.3 5.1%
Sweden  8.9 0.4 4.5%
Austria  8.1 0.4 4.3%
Germany  82.0 3.5 4.3%
Belgium  10.2 0.4 3.9%
United Kingdom  58.6 1.6 2.7%
Spain  39.4 1.0 2.5%
Slovenia  2.0 0.1 2.5%
Italy  57.6 1.0 1.7%
Greece  10.6 0.1 1.3%
Romania  22.3 0.2 0.9%
Czech Republic  10.3 0.0 0.0%
Estonia  1.4 0.0 0.0%
Finland  5.2 0.0 0.0%
Hungary  10.1 0.0 0.0%
Ireland  3.7 0.0 0.0%
Latvia  2.4 0.0 0.0%
Lithuania  3.7 0.0 0.0%
Luxembourg  0.4 0.0 0.0%
Malta  0.4 0.0 0.0%
Poland  38.7 0.0 0.0%
Portugal  10.8 0.0 0.0%
Slovakia  5.4 0.0 0.0%
EU TOTAL  482.1  16.1  3.3%
Sources: Eurostat, BBC, CIA Factbook 
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Table 2: NATO and EU Counterterrorism Efforts 
   NATO EU 
Military/Homeland 
Defense       
Guarding 
Approaches/Border 
Control 
STANDNAVFORMED/Operation 
Active Endeavor 
FRONTEX/SISII/EU Transport 
Council/SAFEMED 
Air/Missile Defense 
Theater Missile Defense Program/Air 
C&C System 
EU Military Staff/Military 
Committee 
Consequence 
Management 
Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response 
Coordination Center/Senior Civil 
Emergency Planning Committee 
CT Coordinator/Commission - 6th 
Framework Program for Research 
to support Civil Protection/Central 
Crisis Coordination System 
WMD Non-
proliferation 
NBC Virtual Center of 
Excellence/NBC Battalion  CFSP/WMD rep 
Critical Infrastructure    
Commission/CT Coordinator/JHA 
Ministers 
        
Law Enforcement/ 
Intelligence       
Organized Crime    
CT Coordinator/JHA 
Ministers/Europol/Eurojust 
Terrorist Networks 
Terrorist Threat Intelligence 
Unit/Partnership Action Plan Against 
Terrorism 
CT Coordinator - EU Action 
Plan/SitCen/Trevi Group/Europol 
Terrorist 
Finance/Money 
Laundering    
Europol/JHA 
Ministers/Commission 
Immigration/Asylum     JHA Ministers/Commission 
Biometrics/Data/Privac
y Protection    
EP/FRONTEX/Commission/EU 
Data Protection Supervisor 
        
Diplomacy/Hearts 
and Minds       
Preventing 
Radicalization/Recruit
ment    
Commission/CT Coordinator - EU 
Action Plan 
Democracy Promotion     CFSP/Commission - ENP 
Sources: NATO, EU, DoD 